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Pragmatics as Metacognitive Control
Mikhail Kissine*
Autisme en Contexte: Théorie et Expérience, Université libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, Belgium
The term “pragmatics” is often used to refer without distinction, on one hand,
to the contextual selection of interpretation norms and, on the other hand, to
the context-sensitive processes guided by these norms. Pragmatics in the first
acception depends on language-independent contextual factors that can, but need
not, involve Theory of Mind; in the second acception, pragmatics is a language-specific
metacognitive process, which may unfold at an unconscious level without involving any
mental state (meta-)representation. Distinguishing between these two kinds of ways
context drives the interpretation of communicative stimuli helps dissolve the dispute
between proponents of an entirely Gricean pragmatics and those who claim that some
pragmatic processes do not depend onmind-reading capacities. According to the model
defended in this paper, the typology of pragmatic processes is not entirely determined
by a hierarchy of meanings, but by contextually set norms of interpretation.
Keywords: pragmatic process, metacognition, Theory of Mind, autism spectrum disorder, indirect speech act,
irony, implicature, Relevance theory
1. INTRODUCTION
Everyone agrees that, at some level or another, utterance interpretation involves integrating
contextual information to fill in the gap between the encoded linguistic meaning and what is
actually communicated. To facilitate the discussion to come, context-dependent contents may
be subsumed under two categories. First, context is needed to determine the meaning literally
conveyed by the utterance (e.g., Bach, 1994; Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2004). Let us call such cases
primary meanings:
(1) I have already had breakfast. [meaning that the speaker had breakfast on the day of the utterance]
(2) The fridge is empty. [meaning that the fridge does not contain anything suitable for a proper
meal]
(3) You’re not going to die. [said to child crying because of a minor cut, meaning that she is not
going to die from that cut]
(4) Peter left Mary and she started to drink. [meaning that Mary started to drink after and because
Peter left her]
Second, context is of course needed to recover meanings that are clearly different from or
independent of the utterance literal content. Let us call context-dependent interpretations of this
sort secondary meanings. Standard examples of secondary meanings include:
(5) Irony: This is the best movie I ever saw. [meaning that the speaker really hated it]
(6) (Particularized conversational) implicatures:
a. The candidate’s command of English is excellent and his attendance to tutorials regular.
[in a letter of recommendation for a lectureship in philosophy, strongly suggesting that the
candidate is not suitable for the position];
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b. There is a garage round the corner. [to someone who is
out of petrol, conveying that this garage should be open
and selling petrol] (Grice, 1975)
(7) Indirect speech acts: It is cold in here. [meant as a request to
close the window]
The list of pragmatic phenomena just introduced is by no
means exhaustive; there are many other aspects in which context
influences utterance interpretation. For instance, I leave aside
here the much discussed issue of “generalized” implicatures (e.g.,
Noveck, 2001; Geurts, 2010). Furthermore, the main claim of
the paper is precisely that from a processing point of view
neither secondary nor primary meanings constitute a natural
class. Nonetheless, this two fold distinction is useful to introduce
a chief theoretical divergence within the field of cognitively
oriented pragmatics. The first major view stems from an adoption
of Grice’s (1957) rational reconstructions into a psychological
theory of interpretation.
Proponents of this position claim that any kind of pragmatic
processing involves inferring the intentions that underlie
the speaker’s communicative behavior. They see pragmatic
processing, associated with the derivation of both primary
or secondary meanings, as a homogenous cognitive capacity,
inherently rooted within Theory of Mind (understood as the
capacity to attribute and reason about mental states).
The second camp accepts that Gricean inferences about
communicative intentions are needed to reach secondary
meanings but holds that the derivation of primary meanings
is underpinned by accessibility-based, non-inferential processes.
Under this view, the derivation of primary meanings would then
involve Theory of Mind-independent pragmatic processing.
This debate raises crucial issues about the relationship
between pragmatics and Theory of Mind, and about the (alleged)
modularity of pragmatic processing. But instead of taking
camps, this paper advocates a change of perspective. The term
“pragmatics” is often used to refer without distinction, one the
one hand, to the contextual choice of norms of interpretation
and, on the other hand, to the context-sensitive processes guided
by these interpretative norms. I will argue that pragmatics in the
first sense depends on language-independent contextual factors
that can, but need not, involve Theory of Mind; in the second
sense, pragmatics is a language-specific metacognitive process,
which may unfold at an unconscious level without involving any
kind of meta-representation.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections
I will outline the main features of the two conflicting visions
of pragmatic processing: monolithic, post-Gricean inferential
accounts andmore heterogenous, accessibility-based approaches.
In Section 2, I will take Relevance theory as a paradigmatic
example of the former kind of analysis (Sperber and Wilson,
1995, 2002), and, in Section 3, the distinction between primary
and secondary pragmatic processes, advocated by Recanati
(2004), as an example of the latter. By no means should this
choice be taken as a limitation of the argument scope to these
two particular theories. Simply, whilemany authors leave implicit
the workings of the cognitive model they adhere to, both Sperber
andWilson, and Recanati provide starkly articulated descriptions
of their cognitive commitments. From the critical discussion of
these two polar positions, I will argue that a psychologically valid
pragmatic model should distinguish, as independent dimensions,
between types of meanings (primary vs. secondary), and types
of pragmatic processes (accessibility-based vs. Gricean). I will
then outline of model that would meet such a constraint. The
solution I propose is based on the two-tiered theory of epistemic
acceptance, which I borrow from Proust (2013, pp. 169–184)
and summarize in Section 4. Proust’s insight is that one should
not confuse the choice or acceptance of an epistemic norm
with the acceptance of a level of epistemic success relative to
this norm. Transposing this idea to pragmatics, I will suggest,
in Section 5, that one should distinguish between, one hand,
between contextually determined norms of interpretation and,
on the other hand, cognitive processes that control and lead to the
achievement of this interpretative goal. The change of perspective
advocated in this paper naturally accommodates experimental
data that indicate that pragmatic processing is possible without
sophisticated Theory of Mind, and opens interesting perspectives
on the interpretation of experimental results in pragmatics.
2. RELEVANCE THEORY
Grice’s long-lasting insight is that (non-natural) meaning can
be rationally reconstructed in terms of complex communicative
intentions (Grice, 1957). Under such a reconstruction, a speaker
S (non-naturally) means that p if, and only if:
• S has the intention i1 to make the addressee believe that p;
• S has the intention i2 that the recognition of i1 by the addressee
be a reason for him to believe that p.
This rational reconstruction of communicative behavior
has been quickly transposed into a psychological view of
how utterance contents are recovered by addressees, and
became deeply entrenched in experimental psychology and
cognitive science. To date, the most fully articulated version
of such a post-Gricean approach remains Relevance theory
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995).
2.1. Classic Relevance Theory: A
Pragmatic Module
According to Sperber and Wilson, communicative stimuli
activate a specific interpretation process. While non-
communicative intentional behavior is interpreted by attributing
to the agent an intention to act, according to them the
interpretation of communicative behaviors is mediated by the
attribution an informative intention. Informative intentions
are intentions to provide the addressee with (dispositions to
acquire) new beliefs or to reinforce existing ones. To exemplify
Sperber and Wilson’s distinction between intentions to act
and informative intentions, think first of a stranger on the bus
scratching her head. This is an instance of a non-communicative
gesture; the stranger’s behavior will be interpreted as resulting
from an intention to relieve itching. By contrast, imagine next,
that, when asked about my opinion about a particularly difficult
paper, I demonstratively scratch my forehead. Here my gesture
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is communicative; according to Sperber and Wilson, it will
be interpreted by inferring a certain informative intention
from my behavior, e.g., an intention to make my addressee
acquire or reinforce the belief that I do not have a ready-made
answer.
Communicative stimuli, linguistic, and non-linguistic alike,
can be associated with a virtually infinite number of informative
intentions. The act of scratching my forehead could for instance
mean that I find the answer difficult, but also that I do not
feel comfortable with answering your question because I am
personally acquainted with the author of the paper. Or, to
take a linguistic example, an utterance of I can’t drink may
mean that I cannot drink alcohol because I am driving, that
I do not want to have alcohol because I am often agressive
when inebriated, that I have already had too much alcohol,
that I cannot ingest any liquid because I have a blood test
in an hour, etc. Relevance theory explains how the range of
possible interpretations gets narrowed down by appealing to
(the relatively uncontroversial) hypothesis that human cognition
is geared toward an optimal balance between the cognitive
effects of processing and the processing efforts required to reach
these effects. In the case of communication, the quantity of
the effects of an utterance can be modeled as the number of
new practical and theoretical implications allowed by the output
of its interpretation. Communicative behaviors, according to
Sperber and Wilson, are always perceived as worth processing:
to use their terms, communicative stimuli come “with their own
presumption of relevance.”
The simplest interpretative procedure would be, then, to infer
from the communicative stimuli the informative intention that is
the most relevant from one’s own point of view. Sperber (1994)
suggests that this strategy, which he dubs “Naive Optimism,” is
used by young children. Now, what is relevant from one’s own,
egocentric point of view may be different from the meaning
the speaker actually intended to communicate. The core of the
Gricean conception of speaker’s meaning is that it should be
overt; a speaker usually intends that her addressee recognizes
her informative intention. Exploiting this idea, Relevance theory
posits that the optimal way to reach communicative success,
called “Sophisticated Understanding” by Sperber, is to attribute
to the speaker the informative intention this speaker is likely
to have intended to make mutually manifest to her and to
her addressee. That is, one should base one’s interpretation on
attributing to the speaker a communicative intention to make
mutually manifest an informative intention. The interpretative
inference then runs from the communicative stimuli to the
communicative intention that is the most relevant, given the
speaker’s abilities and preferences, to the informative intention
embedded within this communicative intention.
Importantly, while Relevance theorists admit the existence
of different interpretative strategies, with varying levels of
complexity, they hold that the output of any kind of
interpretative process—be it Naive Optimism or “Sophisticated
Understanding”—involves the attribution of an informative
intention to the speaker. It is this assumption that compels
Sperber and Wilson to posit the existence of a unitary pragmatic
module.
To see why, recall that an informative intention is a mental
state whose content includes the representation of mental states
(speaker’s beliefs). In spite of recent evidence of early first-order
Theory of Mind (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Baillargeon et al.,
2010), there is a consensus that children are not capable to
attribute such complex, second-order mental states until the age
of seven (Perner and Wimmer, 1985; Leekam and Prior, 1994).
And yet, very young children are apt conversationalists, who
prove to be sensitive to the context of the conversation and to the
interlocutor’s perspective. To give a few examples, infants display
pointing behavior with a clearly informative function, which is,
moreover, constrained by their social partner’s state of knowledge
(Liszkowski et al., 2006, 2008). They also interpret ambiguous
requests relative to their partner’s needs and intentions (Grosse
et al., 2010; Schulze et al., 2013). Around thirty months, children
attempt to correct an adult who misunderstood their request
even though they are handed the requested object (Shwe and
Markman, 1997). Three-year-olds also display sensitiveness to
the speaker’s perspective in reacting to synonymous labels; they
are puzzled when their conversational partner suddenly shifts
from using one name for an object to another, synonymous one,
but not when a new speaker, who did not participate in the
ongoing exchange, uses this synonym (Matthews et al., 2010).
In brief, there is a robust set of developmental data showing
that, from a very young age, children use contextual cues to
interpret and produce communicative behavior, even though
they do not master second-order mental state attribution. In
order to account for these empirical facts, Sperber and Wilson
(2002) propose that pragmatic processing is underpinned by
a specific cognitive module, devoted to the interpretation of
communicative behavior. This pragmatic module would be
rooted within a more general Theory of Mind, and would
have an independent, and more precocious, developmental
trajectory. Its output inevitably is the representation of the
speaker’s communicative or, at least, informative intention.
Importantly, for Sperber and Wilson, this holds for the output
of any interpretative process that goes beyond conventional,
linguistically encoded meaning.
2.2. Implicatures: Material vs. Behavioral
As pointed out by Jary (2013), in Sperber and Wilson’s
model, the functioning of the pragmatic module itself does
not necessarily involve the representations of the speaker’s
mental states. That is, utterance content is not necessarily
recovered through inferences about speaker’s intentions. Within
the context of the conversation, the linguistic content of the
utterance activates certain interpretations, the selection of these
interpretations being warranted by the general expectation
of relevance. Imagine a context where S is offered a coffee
and a croissant and responds with an utterance of (8).
This utterance makes accessible the contextually enriched
primary meaning in (9). The topic of the conversation also
makes accessible the background assumption in (10). The
conjunction of (9) and (10) (non-monotonically) allows the
conclusion in (11)—which corresponds to an implicature of the
utterance in (8).
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(8) I have already had breakfast.
(9) The speaker has already had breakfast today.
(10) Having had breakfast on a given day is a good reason for
refusing a breakfast on that same day.
(11) The speaker does not want a coffee and a croissant.
Importantly, the derivation of the implicature in (11) does
not have to chronologically follow that of the primary
meaning (9). Rather, the principle of Relevance leads the
interpreter to expect that the speaker’s utterance will make
manifest a range of additional consequences, viz. secondary
meanings. Some such secondary meanings are made salient
in the context; in the course of the interpretation process
primary and secondary meanings are then adjusted, so that
the primary meanings provide inferential warrant to the
secondary ones. But, as we just saw, such an inference is
possible without any reasoning about speaker’s intentions taking
place. [Even though Jary’s (2013) argument for non-mentalistic
derivation of material implicatures thus allows for a mutual
adjustment between secondary and primary meanings, in still
unpublished work (Jary, unpublished manuscript), he suggests
that the derivation of primary meaning may not even be
necessary.]
A similar rationale may be applied to indirect speech acts.
Imagine a context where the window is open and the speaker
utters (12). Provided that it is desirable for the addressee to relieve
the speaker’s unpleasant feeling of cold, the primary content (13)
can combine with the assumption that closing windows makes
the air warmer to lead to the decision to close the window. In
other words, without the mediation of any hypotheses about
speaker’s intentions the utterance of (12) can serve as a reason
to close the window, and thus lead to a contextually appropriate
interpretation (Kissine, 2013, pp. 102–125).
(12) It is cold in here.
(13) The speaker is cold.
The secondary meaning (11), derived from (8), is an
instance of what Jary calls material implicature. As we
just saw, provided an overall expectation of Relevance,
the derivation of material implicatures does not require
hypotheses about the speaker’s mental states. In this respect,
material implicatures contrast with what Jary calls behavioral
implicatures, whose derivation does require premises about
the speaker’s intentions, beliefs or desires. Take Grice’s (1975)
classic example of a recommendation letter which reads as
(14). In order to derive the implicature that the candidate
is not suitable for the position, in addition to the general
presumption of cooperativeness, one needs premises such as (15)
and (16).
(14) The candidate’s command of English is excellent and his
attendance to tutorials regular.
(15) The author of the letter knows that the candidate’s
competence in philosophy is what is the most relevant for
the addressee’s purpose.
(16) There must be something the author of the letter wishes to
communicate without stating it in the letter.
That is, behavioral implicatures require understanding the
speaker’s motives, as well as making assumptions about the
addressee’s beliefs. This entails that that the derivation of
behavioral implicatures is underpinned by at least second-order
Theory of Mind.
The same holds for irony; what the speaker intends
to communicate through an ironical utterance is inherently
different from the primary content. In order to grasp irony it is
therefore necessary to make hypotheses about what the speaker
believes, as well as about her assumptions about her addressee’s
beliefs (e.g., Bryant, 2012). For instance, to understand that the
speaker of (17) actually hated the movie, the interpreter needs to
assume not only that the speaker did not like the movie, but also
that the speaker assumes that it is mutually obvious to her and to
her addressee that she did not like the movie.
(17) This is the best movie I ever saw.
2.3. Pragmatic Processing with No Theory
of Mind
At this stage, it becomes natural to question the Relevance
theoretic assumption that the output of any type of
pragmatic processing consists in a representation of complex
communicative intentions. Recall that while Relevance theorists
hold that the output of pragmatic processing is always a
representation of the speaker’s informative intention, they admit
different stages of interpretative complexity. Following Sperber’s
strategy of Naive Optimism, the interpreter may just choose,
among different interpretations activated in the context, the
one that is the most accessible from his point of view. This
interpretative strategy perfectly suits the derivation of material
implicatures; as we just saw, these do not require any explicit
representation of speaker’s mental states. While Jary (2013)
holds that Naive Optimism relies on non-mentalistic processes
to reach speaker’s informative intention or communicative goal,
there is no reason why the resulting secondary meaning should
necessarily be embedded within a meta-representationally
complex attribution of informative intentions to the speaker1.
The output of the interpretation of I have already had breakfast
may just be a doxastic-type representation of the content [The
speaker does not want a coffee and a croissant]. Likewise, the
output of the interpretation of the indirect request It is cold in
here may just be a conative representation of the addressee’s
closing the window. Context-sensitive, pragmatic processing
should then be possible even in the absence of a second-order
Theory of Mind. In addition, as also pointed out by Jary,
such pragmatic processing need not be entirely egocentric.
As mentioned earlier, very young children are sensitive to
other people’s perspective, which should allow them to inhibit
interpretations that are relevant from their own point of view,
but incompatible with the speaker’s point of view. It is therefore
possible to posit an interpretation process which is sensitive to
the speaker’s beliefs but that does not rely on complex Theory of
Mind neither in its functioning nor, pace Relevance theory, in its
output.
1But see Jary (2010, pp. 183–185).
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One may then envision a less homogenous picture of
pragmatic processing and modify Sperber’s (1994) scale of
interpretative strategies as follows (see Jary, 2010, p. 186; Kissine,
2013, pp. 78–80):
1. Egocentric relevance: does not require any Theory of Mind,
and is entirely based on egocentric considerations of
accessibility. The output is the representation of a certain
content (viz. non-embedded within the representation of the
speaker’s informative intentions), and is limited to primary
meanings, material implicatures and (some) indirect speech
acts;
2. Allocentric relevance: requires at least implicit first-order
Theory of Mind. It is similar to egocentric relevance, but it
rules out contents that are incompatible with the speaker’s
perspective;
3. “Gricean”, sophisticated interpretation: becomes available only
when (at least) second-order Theory of Mind is operational.
This interpretation strategy involves complex inferences about
speaker’s communicative intentions, and allows the derivation
of behavioral implicatures and comprehension of irony.
This three-pronged hierarchy of interpretative strategies
renders unnecessary resorting to a specific pragmatic module. In
addition, it is fully consistent with what is known about typical
and atypical development. I have argued elsewhere that the first
kind of interpretative strategy is at work in persons with autism
spectrum disorder (ASD, henceforth) and the second in typically
developing children below seven (Kissine, 2012, 2013). There
is a robust consensus that, despite individual differences, most
children and adults with ASD fail to pass first-order Theory
of Mind tasks (e.g., Happé, 1995; Yirmiya et al., 1998; Baron-
Cohen, 2000). However, impairment on first-order Theory of
Mind does not necessarily prevent people with ASD from using
pragmatic processing of the first kind, based on egocentric
relevance (Kissine, 2012, 2013). True, there is a broad consensus
that individuals with ASD struggle with “social” or “inter-
subjective” dimensions of language use. For instance, they often
fail to produce informative, new and relevant conversational
contributions, to respond on topic and to detect conversational
“faux-pas” (e.g., Eales, 1993; Surian et al., 1996; Capps et al., 1998;
Surian and Leslie, 1999; Kaland et al., 2002, 2011; Ziatas et al.,
2003). However, recent research also shows that persons with
ASD are capable to understand metaphors, scalar implicatures
(such as non-logical readings of some) and even indirect requests
(Norbury, 2005; Pijnacker et al., 2009; Chevallier et al., 2010;
Gernsbacher and Pripas-Kapit, 2012; Kissine et al., 2012, 2015)2.
Such a selective pragmatic profile is difficult to explain on a
modular theory of pragmatics. By contrast, it makes sense once
one admits the existence of egocentric pragmatic processing.
Traditional, verbally demanding versions of first-order
Theory of Mind tasks also prove difficult for typically-developing
children below the age of four (e.g., Wellman et al., 2001).
However, there is evidence that implicit understanding of other
2To be more precise, metaphor comprehension is impaired in many individuals
with autism, but this impairment seems to be caused, to a large extent, by reduced
receptive vocabulary, and not by Theory of Mind deficits (e.g., Norbury, 2005).
people’s beliefs is present in typical development as early as at
fifteen months (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate et al.,
2007; Baillargeon et al., 2010)3. Accordingly, typically developing
children below four display awareness of their interlocutor’s
perspective and are already apt conversationalists (see above).
That is, typically developing children can exhibit the second,
allocentric type of interpretation.
However, until second-order Theory of Mind is mature,
roughly around the age of seven, children have difficulties
in understanding irony (e.g., Winner and Leekam, 1991;
Filippova and Astington, 2008), and do not reach the third,
Gricean stage. (Note that on the Sperber and Wilson’s idea of
a pragmatic module, whose functioning and maturation are
independent from Theory of Mind, it is unclear why reaching the
developmental stage required for understanding irony should be
concomitant with the development of second-order Theory of
Mind.)
2.4. Interim Summary
The foregoing discussion of Relevance theory may be
summarized in two general points. First, the steps leading to
context-dependent, pragmatic interpretations do not necessarily
involve assumptions about the speaker’s mental states, but may
be based exclusively on contextual accessibility considerations.
Second, there are good empirical reasons for believing that
context-dependent interpretation of linguistic meaning does
not always result in hypotheses about the speaker’s complex
communicative intentions. In some cases, the interpretation
output will consist only in a content that is relevant from the
interpreter’s own egocentric point of view; in some others, the
output will be a content relevant from the speaker’s perspective,
but without necessarily involving the attribution of complex,
multilayered communicative intentions to the speaker.
3. RECANATI: PRIMARY VS. SECONDARY
PRAGMATIC PROCESSES
Recanati’s (2004) two-tiered theory of pragmatic processing
is a major contender to the monolithic, modular versions
of Relevance theory, discussed in the previous section. The
gist of his position is to posit two distinct types—primary
vs. secondary—of pragmatic processing, which differ both in
workings and in terms of the output they yield. As his two-
pronged theory pragmatic processing does not necessarily rely
on assumptions about speaker’s communicative intentions, the
division of pragmatic labor posited by Recanati seems to be in
a better position than Relevance theory to accommodate the
empirical data mentioned above. However, on closer inspection
the distinction he proposes, be it in terms of internal pragmatic
process functioning or output, is not entirely straightforward.
3.1. Process Workings
Recanati’s secondary pragmatic processes are Gricean inferences,
based on hypotheses about the speaker’s intentions. According
to him, such secondary pragmatic processes are reserved for the
3Individuals with ASD, by contrast, do no seem to deploy such implicit belief
understanding (Senju et al., 2010).
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derivation of what has been called here secondary meanings,
viz. of contents different from the utterance literal content. By
contrast, context-dependent derivation of primary meanings, in
Recanati’s model, is handled by primary pragmatic processes,
which operate locally on the linguistic structure of the utterance.
Primary pragmatic processes are determined by accessibility
considerations, and do not rely on Theory of Mind. Lexical
items give rise to concurrent activation of multiple semantic
values. Primary pragmatic processes consist in selecting the
most accessible among these values, to subsequently enter
within the compositional computation of primary meanings.
Primary meanings are thus gradually built as lexical items
undergo context-dependent “saturation” (e.g., indexicals such
as she or demonstratives such as this are assigned a referent),
“enrichement” (e.g., and in Peter left Mary and she started to
drink is interpreted as and then, as a result,), “loosening” (e.g.,
the meaning of swallow in The ATM swallowed my credit card is
relaxed to apply to non-living organisms), or “free transfer” (e.g.,
parked associated with the speaker and not her car in I’m parked
in the back).
Now, as discussed in the previous section, it makes sense
to assume that some accessibility-based, primary pragmatic
processes are sensitive to the speaker perspective, without
involving complex mind-reading processes. Admitting that
accessibility-based primary pragmatic processing may be
allocentric remains compatible with the “Availability criterion”
Recanati uses to draw a line between primary and secondary
processes. The outputs of primary pragmatic processes,
viz. primary meanings, can be made available to conscious
introspection, as, for instance, in case of explicit truth-
evaluation. Given a (declarative) sentence and a context of
utterance, our judgements of truth and falsity, claims Recanati,
bear on the contents yielded by primary pragmatic processes.
The unfolding of primary pragmatic processes, however, is
irreducibly unconscious: interpreters are not conscious of the
steps that lead them from linguistic form to pragmatically
enriched, primary meanings. Secondary pragmatic processes, by
contrast, build on primary meanings, and may thus take the form
of a genuine propositional reasoning. Consequently they should
be entirely available to conscious introspection. For instance,
the derivation of irony may be made available to the interpreter
consciousness as a series of inferential steps. In other words,
secondary pragmatic processes consist in—or, at least, can be
reconstructed as—a sequence of (non-monotonic) inferential
steps about the speaker’s beliefs and intentions.
3.2. Types of Processes vs. Types of
Meanings
A consequence of the way Recanati defines primary and
secondary pragmatic processes is that in his theory the selection
of the type of pragmatic processing—primary or secondary—is
entirely determined by the interpretation input. While primary
processes operate on lexical items, secondary pragmatic processes
are intrinsically “post-propositional”; they consist in an inference
from primary to secondary meanings. It thus seems that
any pragmatic interpretation that does not directly build on
the utterance linguistic structure should only be derivable, in
Recanati’s theory, through Gricean inferences about speaker’s
intentions. This is problematic. Implicatures and indirect speech
acts are derived, according to Recanati, from primary meanings.
However, as we saw in the previous section, material implicatures
and indirect speech acts—which are secondary meanings—may
be derived with no appeal to the reconstruction of speaker’s
communicative intentions.
To be fair, it is not obvious whether, for Recanati, the
conceptual precedence of primary over secondary pragmatic
processes extends to psychological processing. He does go
at great lengths to argue that implicature derivation is not
necessarily handled by conscious and voluntary inferences
about the speaker’s intentions. Yet, such pragmatic processing
is still secondary, according to him, because the inference
from primary meaning to the implicature is available, ex
post facto, to the interpreter’s consciousness (Recanati, 2004,
pp. 46–50, 70–71). Under one interpretation of this claim,
secondary pragmatic processes may occur both at unconscious
and conscious levels, but still differ from primary ones in terms
of their workings. Derivation of secondary meanings should then
always presuppose a complex Theory of Mind, which would
make developmental data discussed above as problematic for
Recanati as it is for Sperber and Wilson. Recall, for exemple,
that children with ASD (Kissine et al., 2012, 2015), as well as
typically developing toddlers (Reeder, 1978; Shatz, 1978; Schulze
and Tomasello, 2015), understand indirect requests. Another
reading of Recanati’s theory, more in line with the view argued
for at the end of the previous section, is that some secondary
meanings, such as material implicatures and indirect speech acts,
may be derived through either primary or secondary pragmatic
processes. This reinterpretation of Recanati’s theory entails that
types of pragmatic processing do not necessarily correlate with
types (primary vs. secondary) of meanings. While this is the
view I wish to defend, it is important to emphasize that the
challenge now becomes to explain what drives the selection of
the pragmatic process type.
3.3. Interim Summary
At this stage, we reach a rather complex picture. In agreement
with Jary and Recanati, it makes sense to posit that some
context-dependent, pragmatic processes do not involve Theory
of Mind, but are accessibility-based. However, types of pragmatic
processes do not correlate with types of meanings, as some
secondary meanings (material implicatures and indirect
speech acts) may be derived using contextual accessibility
alone, without involving Theory of Mind. In addition,
while the output of some pragmatic processing consists in
attributing complex communicative intentions to the speaker,
contextual interpretation of linguistic meaning may also yield
representations of the utterance contents without involving any
representation of the speaker’s mental states. That is, secondary
meanings, such as material implicatures or indirect speech
acts, need not correspond to a complex meta-representation
of speaker’s informative intention. In Section 5, I will sketch a
proposal where types of pragmatic processes are not determined
by types of meanings. The main idea will be that types
of meanings (primary or secondary) are recovered relative to
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contextually determined norms of interpretation, which may, but
need not target speaker’s communicative intentions, and may be
entirely egocentric or partly depend on the speaker’s perspective.
Pragmatic processes lead to and monitor the construction of
utterance contents relative to norms of interpretation.
While this way of thinking about pragmatics may seem quite
unusual, it has in fact straightforward parallels in cognitive
science. On such a conception, pragmatic processing belongs
to the broader category of meta-cognitive processes associated
with epistemic acceptance. More particularly, the model I will
defend has clear parallels with a contextualist view of epistemic
acceptance, to this discussion of which I turn now.
4. TWO KINDS OF EPISTEMIC
ACCEPTANCE
Acceptance refers to a mental action that consists in including a
proposition among one’s beliefs (hence making it available for
subsequent action planning and inference). Thus defined,
acceptance includes, for instance, accepting that one’s
recollection of an event is faithful enough, that a story one
hears is truthful or that one’s interpretation of a difficult passage
in a book is accurate enough.
From an epistemological point of view, there are two, equally
plausible, norms for acceptance that a rational system should
follow. The first norm for acceptance is set relative to a certain
confidence threshold; whenever a rational agent has a certain
degree of confidence n that a proposition p is true—such that,
say, 0.5 < n ≤ 1—she should accept p. The second norm obeys
consistency requirements: a rational agent should accept any
consequence that follows from a proposition or a conjunction of
propositions she previously accepted. However, the conjunction
of these two norms begets two notorious paradoxes (Hempel,
1962; Makinson, 1965). The first paradox is standardly illustrated
with a lottery example. Imagine a lottery with one winning ticket
over a thousand. When one buys a ticket, there is a probability of
0.999 that it will lose. Since 0.999 is a fairly reasonable confidence
threshold, the first epistemic norm of acceptance dictates that the
buyer should accept that her ticket will lose. Now, every ticket
has exactly the same chance to win, and, accordingly, one should
accept, about each individual ticket, that it will not win. However,
it follows, from the second norm of acceptance, that one should
accept that no ticket in the whole lot will win. To see the second
paradox imagine a historian that compiles a lifelong work on,
say, the reign of Peter the Great. As she writes, she has sufficient
confidence for accepting each claim she makes. However, given
the breadth of her endeavor it seems that it would be rational
for her to accept that, as a whole, her book may contain some
inaccuracies. Yet, if the book is taken as the sum of individual
claims she accepted on the basis of the first norm, this acceptance
should be irrational.
These two infamous paradoxes may be dissolved by
acknowledging that norms for epistemic acceptance vary context
from context (Kaplan, 1981). In some contexts, it is the proximity
to truth that is important—e.g., How exact is my recollection
of a particular utterance?—and it is the first norm that applies.
In some others, it is the internal consistency of a set of
propositions that matters—e.g., How consistent is my recollection
of a conversation?—and it is the second norm that applies.
Building on Kaplan’s idea, Proust (2013, chapter 8) points out
that there are more norms than these two. Acceptance may be
guided by adherence to a shared disposition to act in a group;
for instance, in conducting peace talks, a proposition ought to be
accepted, if, and only if, it is coherent with the team’s general plan
of negotiation. Or, in writing a novel, the writer will be guided
in her acceptance of a proposition by coherence with the fiction
background.
The major consequence of this contextualist view of
acceptance is that the selection of the acceptance norm, viz. of
the kind of acceptance at stake, is independent of the monitoring
of success relative to this norm. The selection of this or that norm
of acceptance depends on one’s appraisal of the environment and
practical goals: should I privilege truth, consistency, adequacy
with my group plans.... Acceptance of the proposition itself,
e.g., its integration within one’s beliefs or within a line of
argument, proceeds relative to this norm. The adequacy of the
process of acceptance relative to the norm is then monitored and
controlled at a metacognitive level, by specific procedural loops
operating on aspects of cognitive processes (Koriat, 2000; Proust,
2013).
It is standard to draw a distinction between types of
metacognitive control that can be made available to conscious
introspection and those that are best seen as unconscious
processes (Koriat, 2000; Shea et al., 2014 ; for a more nuanced
view, see Metcalfe and Son, 2012). Meta-cognitive judgements
may be brought to consciousness and take the form of deliberate
inferences about one’s beliefs and memories. An instance of a
meta-cognitive judgement is making an inference about one’s
likelihood to provide an answer in a memory task, based, for
instance, on the task complexity and previous experience. Meta-
cognitive feelings also provide feedback in the epistemic domain,
but they are difficult to reconstruct in inferential terms. The
clearest example of a meta-cognitive feeling is the “tip-of-the-
tongue” experience: the subject can more or less accurately
assess the likelihood of her recalling an information to which,
however, she has no conscious access. Applied to epistemic
acceptance, meta-cognitive feelings may provide the subject with
an assessment of the adequacy of the output relative to the
norm without her having conscious access to the grounds of this
normative assessment.
This latter point is consistent with the idea that although
metacognition operates on cognitive processes it does not entail
meta-representation of mental states. The two main arguments
for holding that metacognitive does not require mindreading
are: (a) the differential appraisal of one’s own and other
people’s performance on a cognitive task, and (b) the evidenced
metacognitive processes in vertebrates that have no Theory of
Mind (e.g., Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996; Koriat, 2000; Proust,
2013; Shea et al., 2014).
To sum up, a contextualist theory of epistemic acceptance
entails the following three fold procedural distinction:
1. Context-dependent selection of the norm of acceptance;
2. The metacognitive process that monitors and controls
acceptance;
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 2057
Kissine Pragmatics as Metacognitive Control
3. The resulting acceptance (or integration).
I will now argue that this distinction exactly parallels pragmatic
processing of a linguistic utterance. To the context-dependent
norms of acceptance correspond context-dependent norms
of interpretation; to the metacognitive processes correspond
pragmatic processes, and to the result, i.e., to the acceptance
itself, correspond the final representation(s) of the utterance
content(s).
5. NORMS OF INTERPRETATION VS.
PRAGMATIC PROCESSES
Deriving the meaning of an utterance is an epistemic
operation, which terminates with the acceptance of a particular
interpretation. Just as one should distinguish between the
contextual selection of an acceptance norm and the acceptance
process relative to this norm, one should not confuse the norm
of an interpretation process with the interpretation process itself.
A good way to understand this point is to consider the different
ways utterance interpretation may go wrong. The distinction
between the selection of the acceptance norm, and acceptance as
assessment relative to this norm entails that one may be wrong
in two different ways: either by failing to select the contextually
appropriate acceptance norm or because of a meta-cognitive
failure to assess adequately one’s judgement relative to this
norm. The same applies to pragmatic processing. Take, as an
illustration, irony misunderstandings. There are two ways one
can fail to understand irony. One may fail to understand that the
speaker is being ironic and stick to the literal interpretation. In
this case, the norm of interpretation has not been adequately set
relative to the context of conversation. Or, one may understand
that the speaker is being ironic but fail to discern what she
actually means (realizing one’s failure or not). This time the
interpretative norm has been adequately set; however, either no
interpretation is arrived at (as the interpreter adequately rejects
all candidate contents) or the interpretation process delivers
a content the interpreter mistakenly accepts as contextually
adequate.
As we saw earlier, understanding irony requires grasping
speaker’s beliefs and intentions; the appropriate contextual norm
here is the recovery of the speaker’s communicative intentions.
Interpreting the utterance relative to this norm thus requires
a specific monitoring and control process, which must draw
on the attribution of second-order mental states. Once such a
complex interpretative norm has been set, the control mechanism
that yields awareness of interpretative failure or success is
probably an instance of metacognitive judgement, which can
be explicitly reconstructed as an inferential explanation (based
on standard Gricean considerations of discrepancy between the
literal meaning and the context).
Contrasting with irony, the first two interpretative strategies
identified at the end of Section 2—egocentric and allocentric
relevance—correlate with more modest norms of egocentric
relevance, mitigated or not by the integration of the speaker’s
perspective. Pragmatic processes guided by such less complex
interpretative norms rely on contextual accessibility without
involving complex mind-reading. That is, they terminate once a
sufficiently accessible interpretation has been reached.
It is worth emphasizing that such processes are genuinely
context-dependent, and not guided by mere salience. In
Recanati’s (2004, p. 30) definition, the most accessible meaning
of a lexical item “corresponds to the most active interpretation
when the interpretation process stabilizes.” Salience of a lexical
meaningmay be determined by its frequency of use, familiarity to
the interpreter or prototypicality. Lexical meanings are activated
according to their relative salience independently of and in
parallel to contextual factors, which means that in contexts
that favor non-salient meanings of a lexeme, its salient, but
contextually inadequate meanings are still activated (see Giora,
2003). For instance, the most salient (frequent) meaning of bulb
is [light bulb]. Peleg et al. (2001) found that this meaning is
activated in (18), even though it is contextually inappropriate.
(18) The gardener dug a hole. The bulb was inserted
Accordingly, even when the interpretation norm is simple
egocentric relevance, metacognitive control will be intrinsically
context-sensitive. For instance, it is very plausible that the
contextually adequate interpretation of bulb in (20) may be
reaching using an entirely egocentric interpretative norm.
However, this interpretation process is pragmatic as it involves
inhibiting the salient, but contextually inadequate meaning light
bulb, which was automatically activated.
In line with Recanati’s theory, accessibility-based processes
probably remain out of conscious reach of the interpreters.
While the progression of Gricean inferential processes, such
as irony derivation, is controlled by metacognitive judgements,
control of unconscious pragmatic processes is more likely to
correspond to a metacognitive feeling. To be sure, this idea
needs extensive empirical confirmation. However, it is intuitively
plausible that garden-path interpretations are accompanied by a
distinctive feeling “of something being wrong.” As we just saw,
the most salient meaning of bulb is “light bulb”; as a result,
when the interpretation of (19) reaches the end of the sentence,
backtracking is likely to occur.
(19) The bulbs John stored in his closet have flowered.
It seem plausible that this backtracking is accompanied by
a metacognitive feeling of interpretative failure. If so, there
is a similarity between the meta-cognitive feelings associated
with non-Gricean pragmatic processes and the tip-of-tongue
phenomenon: in both cases, the metacognitive feeling provides
conscious feedback on an unconscious process.
Independently of the validity of the contrast between
metacognitive judgements and feelings, be it in pragmatics or
more generally, the parallel I am drawing between metacognitive
control of epistemic acceptance and pragmatic processing
provides a fresh conceptual framework for thinking about the
ways context determines utterance interpretation. Context plays
two distinct roles, which should not be confused. First, context is
required to set up an interpretation norm. In some contexts, this
norm will be complete recovery of the speaker’s communicative
intentions (for instance, the conversation is full of innuendo or
the speaker is being clearly sarcastic). In some other contexts,
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TABLE 1 | Meanings vs. pragmatic processes vs. interpretation norms.




















the norm is the interpretation that is the most relevant given
the speaker’s perspective. And in still some other contexts,
simple egocentric relevance is sufficient. Contextual selection of
appropriate interpretative norms is largely independent of the
linguistic input; drawing on world-knowledge and interactional
experiences, it consists in the assessment of the frame of
interaction4.
Second, the success of interpretative processes must be
monitored and controlled relative to this norm. That is,
pragmatic processes involve contextual selection among activated
meanings and assessment of the unfolding interpretation
relative to the interpretative norm. The input of the pragmatic
interpretative processes is restricted to linguistic, or at least,
communicative stimuli. However, the kind of contextual
resources required for pragmatic processing—and in particular,
the extent to which it draws on Theory of Mind—depends on
the interpretative norm it is geared to. In sum, the selection
of interpretative norms is context-driven, while pragmatic
processing is context-senstive but driven by the selected
interpretative norm.
The model I propose is summarized in Table 1. Its most
important feature is that the typology of pragmatic processes is
not determined by a hierarchy of meanings. Whether pragmatic
processing involves Theory of Mind or not depends on the kind
of interpretative norm that has been contextually selected. The
crucial empirical prediction that follows is that some kinds of
meaning may be derived through different types of pragmatic
processing. This is consistent with the fact that, as we saw above,
material implicatures or indirect speech acts may sometimes be
interpreted in an entirely egocentric way.
Another straightforward prediction of this model is that
the repertoire of available interpretative norms varies across
interpreters. Drawing again a parallel with epistemic acceptance,
acquiring some epistemic norms—e.g., logical consistency—
requires considerable cognitive maturation, and emerge late in
4Of course, in some cases the linguistic input may trigger the switch from an
egocentric to a more complex Gricean interpretative norm. In particular, search
for ironic interpretation may be primed by prosody or discourse context (e.g.,
Kowatch et al., 2013; Spotorno and Noveck, 2014). More often, however, ironic
interpretation will be triggered because interpretation driven by a more modest
norm fails to deliver any plausible output.
ontogenesis. Likewise, the interpretative norm consisting in the
full recovery of the speaker’s communicative intentions should
not emerge until second-order Theory of Mind is mature. Some
secondary meanings, such as irony, cannot be derived in the
absence of such complex interpretative norms; some others,
however, such as material implicatures and indirect speech acts,
may be reached through less complex processing. This is why
appropriate indirect request understanding has been observed in
typically developing toddlers (Shatz, 1978; Reeder, 1978; Schulze
and Tomasello, 2015) and children with ASD (Kissine et al., 2012,
2015), two population with no complex Theory of Mind5.
This last point should not be taken as implying that once a
more complex interpretative norm is operational it overwrites
less complex norms, which were available earlier on; rather,
pragmatic development enriches the repertoire of interpretative
norms, which all remain available to the interpreter. It is
plausible to assume that when a less demanding norm, such
as egocentric relevance, appears to be suitable, it will be
privileged over the more complex, Gricean norm. In many
contexts competent, adults interpreters limit themselves to such
an egocentric interpretation6. This is also consistent with the idea
that, in most situations, interpreters automatically integrate the
utterance content within their beliefs. On the model defended
here, interpretation outputs are not always embedded within
complex meta-representations of the speaker’s communicative
intentions (see Kissine, 2013, pp. 80–101, Kissine and Klein,
2013). While such meta-representational outputs probably form
a barrier against automatic integration (cf. Sperber et al., 2010),
they will not emerge in contexts where interpretation is geared
toward a less complex interpretation norm.
A connected prediction is that differential processing of the
same stimuli may be evidenced in experimental paradigms that
make salient different interpretation norms to participants7.
Therefore, great care must be paid, in the interpretation of
experimental results, not to confuse the type of meaning
supposed to be illustrated by the stimuli and the actual processing
that took place in the participants’ minds.
As a brief example of this last point, take irony comprehension
in autism. As already mentioned, there is a widespread consensus
that irony comprehension requires second-order Theory ofMind
(e.g., Bryant, 2012). It is therefore expected that persons with
ASD who do not have second-order Theory of Mind fail to
understand irony (Happé, 1993; Leekam and Prior, 1994; Martin
and McDonald, 2004). It may seem surprising, then, that in
Chevallier et al. (2011) and Colich et al. (2012) participants
with ASD correctly discriminate between “ironical” and “literal”
interpretations. However, that the task in these two studies
consisted in choosing between two responses, literal vs. ironic.
5See also Spotorno and Noveck (2014) on individual differences in strategies used
for irony detection.
6This assumption has interesting parallels with the “Good enough” approach,
according to which syntactic and semantic processing remains shallow whenever
a detailed interpretation is not required by the task at hand (Ferreira and Patson,
2007).
7In fact, this point is consonant with the well-established finding that some
cognitive biaises may be reduced by preventing participants from reading
experimenter’s intentions within experimental instructions (e.g., Wright and
Wells, 1988; Schwarz et al., 1991).
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Furthermore, unlike their literal counterpart, ironic stimuli were
incongruent with the preceding context and characterized by
a marked intonation. In real-life situations, the interpretative
norm associated with ironical interpretation is the recovery of
the speaker’s intentions. However, in the experimental studies
under discussion, the more modest norm, consisting in rejecting
the literal interpretation, sufficed to provide the correct response
(a consequence acknowledged by Colich et al., 2012). Pragmatic
processing guided by such a normmay remain entirely egocentric
and accessibility-based in its workings.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper urges a change of perspective on pragmatic
processing by distinguishing contextually-dependent selection of
interpretative norms and context-sensitive pragmatic processing.
A crucial feature of this proposal is that types of processing
(accessibility based vs. Gricean) do not correlate with types
of meaning (primary vs. secondary). At this stage, the model
remains largely speculative, and many details need to be filled
in. For instance, while I focused on three interpretative norms,
inspired by Sperber (1994) and Jary (2010, pp. 185–187), there
may be more. In addition, links between general metacognitive
control and pragmatic performance should be empirically
investigated. However, the model proposed allows a better
integration of experimental data on pragmatic processing in early
typical and atypical development. Furthermore, it contributes to
building a research framework within which the interpretation
of experimental results is sensitive to the interpretative norms
participants are likely to select.
FUNDING
This research is part of a research project funded by
the F.R.S.-FNRS Research Incentive Grant F.4502.15 and
the Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles ARC-Consolidator Grant
“Context in Autism.”
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to Mark Jary and to Marc Dominicy for comments
and discussions on an earlier draft of this paper. Comments by
the two reviewers prompted me to greatly clarify the structure of
the paper.
REFERENCES
Bach, K. (1994). “Semantic slack. What is said and more,” in Foundations of Speech
Act Theory. Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, ed S. Tsohatzidis (London:
Routledge), 267–291.
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., and He, Z. J. (2010). False-belief understanding
in infants. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 110–118. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.
12.006
Baron-Cohen, S. (2000). “Theory of mind and autism: a fifteen year review,” in
Understanding OtherMinds. Perspectives fromDevelopmental Cognitive Science,
2nd Edn., eds S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and D. J. Cohen (Oxford:
Oxford University Press), 3–20.
Bryant, G. A. (2012). Is verbal irony special? Lang. Linguist. Compass 6, 673–685.
doi: 10.1002/lnc3.364
Capps, L., Kehres, J., and Sigman, M. (1998). Conversational abilities among
children with autism and children with developmental delays. Autism 2, 325–
344.
Carston, R. (2002). Thoughts and Utterances. The Pragmatics of Explicit
Communication. Oxford: Blackwell.
Chevallier, C., Noveck, I., Happé, F. G. E., and Wilson, D. (2011). What’s in
a voice? Prosody as a test case for the Theory of Mind account of autism.
Neuropsychologia 49, 507–517. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.11.042
Chevallier, C., Wilson, D., Happé, F. G. E., and Noveck, I. (2010). Scalar inferences
in autism spectrum disorders. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 40, 1104–1017. doi:
10.1007/s10803-010-0960-8
Colich, N. L., Wang, A.-T., Rudie, J. D., Hernandez, L. M., Bookheimer, S. Y., and
Dapretto, M. (2012). Atypical neural processing of ironic and sincere remarks
in children and adolescents with Autism SpectrumDisorders.Metaphor Symbol
27, 70–92. doi: 10.1080/10926488.2012.638856
Eales, M. J. (1993). Pragmatic impairments in adults with childhood diagnoses of
autism or developmental receptive language disorder. J. Autism Dev. Disord.
23, 593–617.
Ferreira, F., and Patson, N. D. (2007). The “Good Enough” approach to language
comprehension. Lang. Linguist. Compass 1, 71–83. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-
818X.2007.00007.x
Filippova, E., and Astington, J. W. (2008). Further development in social reasoning
revealed in discourse irony understanding. Child Dev. 79, 126–138. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01115.x
Gernsbacher, M. A., and Pripas-Kapit, S. R. (2012). Who’s missing the point?
A commentary on claims that autistic persons have a specific deficit
in figurative language comprehension. Metaphor Symbol 27, 93–105. doi:
10.1080/10926488.2012.656255
Geurts, B. (2010). Quantity Implicatures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giora, R. (2003).On ourMind. Salience, Context, and Figurative Language. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. Philos. Rev. 66, 377–388.
Grice, H. P. (1975). “Logic and conversation,” in Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech
Acts, eds P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (New York, NY: Academic Press), 41–58.
Grosse, G., Moll, H., and Tomasello, M. (2010). 21-month-old understand
the cooperative logic of requests. J. Pragmat. 42, 3377–3383. doi:
10.1016/j.pragma.2010.05.005
Happé, F. G. E. (1993). Communicative competence and Theory of Mind in
autism. A test of relevance theory. Cognition 48, 101–119.
Happé, F. G. E. (1995). The role of age and verbal ability in the Theory of Mind
task performance of subjects with autism. Child Dev. 66, 843–855.
Hempel, C. G. (1962). Deductive-nomological vs. statistical explanation.
Minnesota Stud. Philos. Sci. 3, 98–169.
Jary, M. (2010). Assertion. London: Palgrave.
Jary, M. (2013). Two types of implicature: material and behavioural. Mind Lang.
28, 638–660. doi: 10.1111/mila.12037
Kaland, N., Moller-Nielsen, A., Callesen, K., Mortensen, E. L., Gottlieb, D., and
Smith, L. (2002). A new ‘advanced’ test of theory of mind: evidence from
children and adolescents with Asperger syndrome. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry
43, 517–528. doi: 10.1111/1469-7610.00042
Kaland, N., Mortensen, E. L., and Smith, L. (2011). Social communication
impairments in children and adolescents with Asperger syndrome: slow
response time and the impact of prompting. Res. Autism Spectrum Disord. 5,
1129–1137. doi: 10.1016/j.rasd.2010.12.009
Kaplan, M. (1981). Rational acceptance. Philos. Stud. 40, 129–145.
Kissine, M. (2012). Pragmatics, cognitive flexibility and Autism Spectrum
Disorders.Mind Lang. 28, 1–28. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01433.x
Kissine, M. (2013). From Utterances to Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kissine,M., De Brabanter, P., and Leybaert, J. (2012). The interpretation of requests
in children with autism: the effect of the sentence-type.Autism 16, 523–532. doi:
10.1177/1362361311406296
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 2057
Kissine Pragmatics as Metacognitive Control
Kissine, M., Cano-Chervel, J., Carlier, S., De Brabanter, P., Ducenne, L., Pairon,
M.-C., et al. (2015). Children with autism understand indirect speech acts:
evidence from a semi-structured act-out task. PLoS ONE 10:e0142191. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0142191
Kissine, M., and Klein, O. (2013). “Models of communication, epistemic trust and
epistemic vigilance,” in Social Cognition and Communication, eds J. P. Forgas,
O. Vincze, and J. Lázló (New York, NY: Psychology Press), 139–154.
Koriat, A. (2000). The feeling of knowing: some metatheoretical implications
for consciousness and control. Consciousness Cogn. 9, 149–171. doi:
10.1006/ccog.2000.0433
Koriat, A., and Goldsmith, M. (1996). Monitoring and control processes in the
strategic regulation of memory accuracy. Psychol. Rev. 103, 490–517.
Kowatch, K., Whalen, J. M., and Pexman, P. M. (2013). Irony comprehension in
action: a new test of processing verbal irony. Discourse Process. 50, 301–315.
doi: 10.1080/0163853X.2013.799934
Leekam, S. R., and Prior, M. (1994). Can autistic children distinguish lies from
jokes? A second look at second-order belief attribution. J. Child Psychol.
Psychiatry 35, 901–915.
Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., Striano, T., and Tomasello, M. (2006). 12- and 18-
month-olds point ot provide information for others. J. Cogn. Dev. 7, 173–187.
doi: 10.1207/s15327647jcd0702_2
Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., and Tomasello, M. (2008). Twelve-month-olds
communicate helpfully and appropriately for knowledgeable and ignorant
partners. Cognition 108, 72–739. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.013
Makinson, D. C. (1965). The paradox of the preface. Analysis 25, 205–207. doi:
10.1093/analys/25.6.205
Martin, I., and McDonald, S. (2004). An exploration of causes of non-literal
language problems in individuals with Asperger Syndrome. J. Autism Dev.
Disord. 34, 311–328. doi: 10.1023/B:JADD.0000029553.52889.15
Matthews, D., Lieven, E., and Tomasello, M. (2010). What’s in a manner of
speaking? Children’s sensitivity to partner-specific referential precedents. Dev.
Psychol. 46, 749–760. doi: 10.1037/a0019657
Metcalfe, J., and Son, L. (2012). “Anoetic, noetic, and autonoetic metacognition,”
in The Foundations of Metacognition, eds M. Brenan, J. Brandl, J. Perner, and
J. Proust (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 289–301.
Norbury, C. F. (2005). The relationship between theory of mind and
metaphor: evidence from children with language impairment and autistic
spectrum disorder. Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 23, 383–399. doi: 10.1348/026151005
X26732
Noveck, I. (2001). When children are more logical than adults: experimental
investigations of scalar implicature. Cognition 78, 165–188. doi: 10.1016/S0010-
0277(00)00114-1
Onishi, K., and Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false
beliefs? Science 308, 255–258. doi: 10.1126/science.1107621
Peleg, O., Giora, R., and Fein, O. (2001). Salience and context effects: two are
better than one. Metaphor Symbol 16, 173–192. doi: 10.1080/10926488.2001.
9678894
Perner, J., and Wimmer, E. (1985). “John thinks that Mary thinks that...”.
Attribution of second-order belief by 5- to 10-year-old children, J. Child Exp.
Psychol. 39, 437–471.
Pijnacker, J., Hagoort, P., Buitelaar, J., Teunisse, J.-P., and Geurts, B. (2009).
Pragmatic inferences in high-functionning adults with autism and Asperger
syndrome. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 39, 607–618. doi: 10.1007/s10803-008-
0661-8
Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-
awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Recanati, F. (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reeder, K. (1978). The emergence of illocutionary skills. J. Child Lang. 7, 13–28.
Schwarz, N., Strack, F., Hilton, D. J., and Naderer, G. (1991). Base rates,
representativeness, and the logic of conversation: the contextual relevance of
"irrelevant" information. Soc. Cogn. 9, 67–84.
Schulze, C., Grassmann, S., and Tomasello, M. (2013). 3-year-old children make
relevance inferences in indirect verbal communication. Child Dev. 84, 2079–
2093. doi: 10.1111/cdev.12093
Schulze, C., and Tomasello, M. (2015). 18-month-olds comprehend indirect
communicative acts. Cognition 136, 91–98. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.
11.036
Senju, A., Southgate, V., Miura, Y., Matsui, T., Hasegawa, T., Tojo, Y., et al.
(2010). Absence of spontaneous action anticipation by false belief attribution
in children with Autism Spectrum Disorders. Dev. Psychopathol. 22, 353–360.
doi: 10.1017/S0954579410000106
Shatz, M. (1978). On the development of communicative understandings: an
early strategy for interpreting and responding to messages. Cogn. Psychol. 10,
271–301.
Shea, N., Boldt, A., Bang, D., Yeung, N., Heyes, C., and Frith, C. D. (2014). Supra-
personal cognitive control and metacognition. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 186–193.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.01.006
Shwe, H., and Markman, E. (1997). Young children’s appreciation of
the mental impact of their communicative signals. Dev. Psychol. 33,
630–636.
Southgate, V., Senju, A., and Csibra, G. (2007). Action anticipation through
attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds. Psychol. Sci. 18, 587–592. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x
Sperber, D. (1994). “Understanding verbal understanding,” in What is
Intelligence? ed J. Khalfa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
179–198.
Sperber, D., Clément, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G. et al.
(2010). Epistemic vigilance. Mind Lang. 25, 359–393. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
0017.2010.01394.x
Sperber, D., andWilson, D. (1995). Relevance: Communication and Cognition, 2nd
Edn. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sperber, D., and Wilson, D. (2002). Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading.
Mind Lang. 17, 3–23. doi: 10.1111/1468-0017.00186
Spotorno, N., and Noveck, I. (2014). When is irony effortful? J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
143, 1649–1665. doi: 10.1111/1468-0017.00186
Surian, L., Baron-Cohen, S., and Van der Lely, H. (1996). Are children with autism
deaf to Gricean Maxims? Cogn. Neuropsychiatry 1, 55–71.
Surian, L., and Leslie, A. M. (1999). Competence and performance in false belief
understanding: a comparison of autistic and normal 3-year-old children. Br. J.
Dev. Psychol. 17, 141–155.
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., and Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-
mind development: the truth about false belief. Child Dev. 72, 655–684. doi:
10.1111/1467-8624.00304
Winner, E., and Leekam, S. R. (1991). Distinguishing irony from deception:
understanding the speaker’s second-order intention. Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 9,
257–270.
Wright, E. F., and Wells, G. L. (1988). Is the attitude-attribution paradigm
suitable for investigating the dispositional bias? Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 14,
183–190.
Yirmiya, N., Erel, O., Shaked, M., and Solomonica-Levi, D. (1998). Meta-analyses
comparing theory of mind abilities of individuals with autism, individuals with
mental retardation, and normally developing individuals. Psychol. Bull. 124,
283–307.
Ziatas, K., Durkin, K., and Pratt, C. (2003). Differences in assertive speech acts
produced by children with autism, Asperger syndrome, specific language
impairment, and normal development. Dev. Psychopathol. 15, 73–94. doi:
10.1017/S0954579403000051
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Kissine. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance
with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted
which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 2057
